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Abstract. A sentence A is epistemically ess entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B
if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up 
A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment asintroduced by 
G~denfors (1988) and elaborated by Gardenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing 
feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and 
elegant construction recipes for minimal changes of belief states. These relations, however, are 
required to satisfy rather demanding conditions. In the present paper we liberalize the concept 
of epistemic entrenchment by removing connectivity, rainimality and maximality conditions. 
Correspondingly, we achieve a liberalization of the concept of rational belief change that does 
no longer presuppose the postulates of success and rational monotony. We show that the central 
results of Gardenfors and Makinson are preserved in our more flexible setting. Moreover, the 
generalized concept of epistemic entrenchment turns out to be applicable also to relational and 
iterated belief changes. 
Key words: Belief revision, epistemic entrenchment, theory change. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a 
sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up 
either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea 
of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Peter Gardenfors (see Garden- 
fors 1988 and Gardenfors and Makinson 1988). It emerged that relations of 
epistemic entrenchment permit a very simple and elegant construction recipe 
for rational changes of belief states (see the definitions (Def- )  and (Def,) 
below). I think it is fair to make the following terminological decision. A 
binary relation between sentences of a given language isa relation ofepistemic 
entrenchment only if it conforms to the fundamental intuitive idea and permits 
a very simple formal construction of belief changes. 
The current theory of epistemic entrenchment has many virtues and a 
number of drawbacks. With epistemic entrenchment one can do anything 
which can be done by other established methods of belief change - provided 
one accepts the entire set of the so-called G~irdenfors postulates for belief 
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revision (see G~denfors 1988, Gardenfors and Makinson 1988, Rott 1991a, 
1992). But there is no flexibility of accepting and rejecting Gfirdenfors's 
supplementary postulates as it is in partial meet and safe contraction (see A1- 
chourr6n, G~irdenfors and Makinson 1985, Alchourr6n and Makinson 1985). 
And there are three formal restrictions for epistemic entrenchment which 
one would intuitively like to r~move. In this paper, I will generalize the 
approach of Gardenfors and Makinson (1988), with inspiration drawn from 
Makinson (1989, 1990), Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990), and Makinson 
and Gardenfors (1991). 
The liberalization of epistemic entrenchment will consist in the removal 
of three formal restrictions. We will have no top, bottom and connectivity 
conditions. An alternative suggestion to remove cormectivity from the re- 
quirements for epistemic entrenchment is due to Lindstr0m und Rabinowicz 
(1991). But as they have to resort o a fairly complicated construction recipe 
for belief changes, their account fails to specify a relation of epistemic en- 
trenchrnent in the sense of our terminological decision. We will be left with 
no theory-relative conditions, nor will we employ non-Hom conditions. We 
call our relation a relation of generalized epistemic entrenchement (GEE- 
relation) and contrast i with the relation of standard epistemic entrenchment 
(SEE-relation) of Gardenfors and Makinson. 
The usual dependency between theories and relations of epistemic en- 
trenchment may be regarded as reversed. While Gardenfors and Makinson 
have SEE-relations with respect o theories, we will define theories with re- 
spect o GEE-relations. In this setting, the modelling of iterated belief change 
is possible, and we will see that one single GEE-relation suffices to define 
a whole belief contraction model. A GEE-relation contains more informa- 
tion than a (preferential) contraction function over a consistent theory K; it 
contains exactly the same information as a (preferential) contraction function 
over the inconsistent theory L. 
By liberalizing epistemic entrenchment wealso liberalize the correspond- 
ing logic of theory change, nonmonotonic logic, or conditional logic. First, 
we remove G~irdenfors's basic condition (K-4)  and allow that a reasoner 
refuses to withdraw sentences which are no logical truths. He or she may 
have a protected "hard core" of sentences which survive every conceivable 
change of belief. Secondly, we find that both of G~irdenfors's supplementary 
conditions are doing two jobs at a time: (K-7),  or rather its analogue (K,7) 
for belief revisions, implies "cut" and "distributivity", while (K-8),  or rather 
its analogue (K,8) for belief revisions, implies "cautious monotony" and "ra- 
tional monotony" (for the meaning of these terms, see Kraus, Lehmann and 
Magidor 1990, Lehmann and Magidor 1990, and Makinson 1990). The most 
striking feature of our treatment is that we will do without rational monotony. 
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In belief revision, (K-8)  is the first condition to be lost when looking at 
some more general method of partial meet contraction or safe contraction 
(see Alchourr6n, G~denfors and Makinson 1985, and Alchourr6n and Ma- 
kinson 1985). In nonmonotonic logic, David Makinson (1990) for instance 
is quite hesitant to accept rational monotony as a desirable property, and he 
shows that it is not satisfied by virtually all of the standard explications of 
defeasible reasoning. A corresponding axiom scheme in conditional logic has 
been criticized by Pollock and Ginsberg. Thus it seems desirable to be able to 
do away with rational monotony while still working with a genuine relation 
of epistemic entrenchment. In analogy to the terminology coined by Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor (1990), we will talk of preferential belief change in 
this paper. 
The object language under consideration is supposed to include the lan- 
guage of propositional logic. It contains the propositional operators -1, A, V, 
--~ and ~-~ (while &, ~ and r are used metalinguistically). By L we denote 
the set of all sentences of this language. In Section 6 we presume that L is 
countable. Throughout the whole paper, variables A, B, C, etc. range over 
sentences in L, H over sets of sentences in L, and K, K ~, etc. over theories 
in L, i.e., sets of sentences in L which are closed under some (well-behaved) 
underlying consequence operation Cn. We assume that Crt includes tauto- 
logical implication, is compact and satisfies the deduction theorem. We use 
Cn( A ) to denote Cn( { A } ), and H + A as an abbreviation of Cn( H U {A}). 
We also use H ~- A for A E Cn(H).  
2. EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT: 
THE STANDARD THEORY OF G~DENFORS AND MAKINSON 
The basic problem is how to eliminate sentences from a given belief state 
I~- under certain integrity constraints. We recapitulate the theory of belief 
contraction and epistemic entrenchment as developed by Gardenfors and 
Makinson (G~denfors 1988 and Gardenfors and Makinson 1988) without 
comments on the intuitive content of the postulates. The reader is referred to 
the original work for motivation and further information. 
Postulates for Gfirdenfors contractions (over K)  
(K -  1) R' -A  is a theory 
(K-2)  K-A  C K 
(K-3)  If A ~ K then K-A  = K 
(K-4)  If A C K -A  then H A 
(K-5)  [( C_ ( i f -A )  + A 
(K=6) If Cn(A)  = Cn(B)  then K=A = K-  B 
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(K-7)  K -A  N K-B  C K -A  A B 
(K-8)  I fA  ~ K-A  A B then K'--A A B C_ K -A .  
(K-1)  - (K-6)  are G~irdenfors's basic postulates, (K-7)  and (K-8)  are 
the supplementary ones. (K - l ) ,  (K-g),  (K-" 7) and (K-8)  are restricted to 
the case where K is a theory. We do not explicitly mention this, because in 
the present paper we consider ofnly the case where K is in fact a theory or, as 
is common jargon, a belief set:At least (K-8),  as well as its counterparts in 
conditional and nonmonotonic logic, are not universally accepted. 
Postulates for standard epistemic entrenchment (with respect o K) 
(SEED If A < B and B <C then A _<C (Transitivity) 
(SEE2) If A t- B then A < B (Dominance) 
(SEE3) A < A A B or B < A A B (Conjunctiveness) 
(SEFA) If K # L then: A < B for every B iff A # K (Bottom) 
(SEE5) If B < A for every B then k A (Top) 
If < is a SEE-relation with respect o a belief set K then "A < B" 
means that B is at least as firmly entrenched in K as A. So far we have 
only introduced postulates for infinite entities, but it is not difficult to offer 
finite representations of an important class of SEE-relations (see Rott 199 lb, 
Section 3). The following facts are intuitively unpleasant: 
- because connectivity follows from (SEED - (SEE3), it is forbidden to 
stay undecided in the comparison of two arbitrary sentences A and B; 
- because of (SEE4), it is forbidden to have a gradation of the sentences 
which are not included in the current belief set K; 
- because of (SEE5), it is forbidden to assign to some sentence a degree of 
epistemic entrenchment which is as high as the degree of logical truth. 
From contractions to standard epistemic entrenchment 
(Def_<) A_<Bi f fA~K' -AABor t -AAB.  
In order to discard A A B from a belief set K it is both necessary and 
sufficient o discard either A or B (or both) from K. So A _< B may be 
interpreted tentatively as saying that when it comes to deciding whether to 
give up either A or B, the reasoner with epistemic entrenchment relation _< 
is ready to give up A. The SEE-relation _< with respect to K defined from a 
given contraction function - over K by (Def<) is denoted E(-) .  
From standard epistemic entrenchment to contractions 
(Def- )  K-A= ~ KN{B'A<AVB} i f~/A 
( K otherwise 
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Here A < A V B means A <_ A V B and A V B ~ A. By connectivity, 
this is equivalent to A V B ~ A. The contraction function - over K defined 
from a given SEE-relation < with respect to K by (Def- )  is denoted C(_<). 
A good deal of justification of this definition derives from the plausibility of 
(Def<) and the following 
Theorem 1 (Giirdenfors and Makinson 1988) 
(i) If < satisfies (SEE1) - (SEE5) then C(_) satisfies (K=l)  - (K:8).  
(ii) If "- satisfies (K - I )  - (K :8)  then E( : )  satisfies (SEE1) - (SEE5). 
(iii) If < satisfies (SEE1) - (SEE5) then E(C(_<)) = _<. 
(iv) If - satisfies (K "--1) - (K-8)  then C(E(- ) )  = - .  
Bearing in mind the above-mentioned points of critique, it is natural to ask 
whether these very nice results can be reproduced in a more general setting. 
3. REVISIONS AND CONTRACTIONS 
Philosophically, contractions are more basic than revisions. In order to mini- 
mally revise a belief set K by a sentence A, first make K consistent with A, 
i.e., remove -~A in some rational and economical way, then add A, and finally 
close under Cn. Most writers in belief revision have advocated this strategy. 
One of the first and most vigorous proponents was Isaac Levi. 
(Levi identity) K * A = (K---A) + A. 
Now consider the following list of "translations" of some eminent pattems 
of nonmonotonic reasoning into the language of belief revision. We mention 
unit versions of cut, cautious monotony, distribution, the hard half of the 
deduction theorem (" conditionalization"), and rational monotony (see Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor 1990, Makinson 1990, and Makinson and Giirdenfors 
1991). 
(Cut) 
(CM) 
(Dis) 
(HHD) 
(RM) 
I fBEK ,AthenK,AABC_K,A .  
I fBcK ,AthenK,AC_K,AAB.  
K,ANK,BCK,AVB.  
K ,AAB C_(K ,A)+B.  
!f-~B ~K,Athen(K ,A)+BC_K,AAB.  
In the presence of the basic G~irdenfors postulates for revision, (Dis) is 
equivalent to (HHD) (see Gardenfors 1988, pp. 56-57). It is remarkable and 
surprising that neither (Cut) nor (CM) is derivable from the basic G~irdenfors 
postulates alone. Given the basic postulates, however, (K,7), which is (HHD) 
(or equivalently, which is (Dis)), implies Cut, and (K,8), which is (RM), 
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implies Cautious Monotony (see Makinson and Ggrdenfors 1991). What are 
the corresponding postulates for contractions obtained via the Levi identity? 
Lemma 1 Given the Levi identity and the basic postulates for contractions, 
the following conditions for - are equivalent with (Cut), (CM), (Dis) and 
(RM), respectively: 
(K-7c)  If B E K -A  A B then K-A  C_ K -A  A B. 
(K-8c) If B E K-A  A B then K-A  A B C_ K -A .  
(K-'7) K-ANK-B  C K -AAB 
(K-8)  I fA~K:AABthenK-AAB CK-A .  
Given (K-1)  - (K-6),  (K-7)  implies (K-7c) and (K-8)  implies (K-8c). 
Proofs of the lemmas and theorems are collected in an appendix at the end 
of the paper. 
The obvious question is whether one can have the contraction counterparts 
of (Cut) and (CM) - which represent two of the most basic patterns of 
nonmonotonic reasoning - without having the full power of (HHD) and 
(RM), respectively. Before answering this question we turn to a trivial formal 
exercise with nontrivial intuitive consequences. 
4. RELATIONS 
Research in partial meet contractions and epistemic entrechment contractions 
has been done by studying non-strict (reflexive) relations < (see Alchourr6n, 
G/irdenfors and Makinson 1985, Gardenfors 1988, G~irdenfors and Makinson 
1988). It turned out that transitivity conditions in this context are both very 
powerful and problematic, while connectivity conditions are neither powerful 
nor problematic (see Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors and Makinson 1985, pp. 519- 
524, G~irdenfors and Makinson 1988, proof of Theorem 5). Research in safe 
contractions, on the other hand, has focused on a strict (irreflexive) relation 
< (see Alchourr6n and Makinson 1985, 1986, Rott 1992). Here the situation 
is just the reverse. Transitivity is harmless and indeed not even needed for 
many purposes, while "virtual connectivity" is very powerful. Intuitively, the 
case of the strict relations is the right one. In general one is willing to accept 
transitivity as a very natural requirement, while connectivity conditions put a 
great strain on a realistic image of a reasoner. Why shouldn't there be incom- 
parabilities? We can resolve this tension by regarding the strict relation < as 
primary and interpreting the non-strict < as its converse complement. This 
will turn incomparabilities under < into indifferences under <. Reinterpret- 
ing _< in this way is, to be sure, somewhat misleading philosophically, but it 
helps the various formal properties of the relations in point to get their due 
intuitive places. Connectivity of < is then natural, transitivity is not. 
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TABLE I 
Corresponding conditions for an arbitrary binary relation R (or "<") over some set 
X (of sentences) and its converse complement X 2 - R - j  (or "<") 
irreflexivity reflexivity 
A~A A<A 
transitivity virtual connectivity 
A<B&B<C~A<C A<B~A<CorC<B 
asymmetry connectedness 
A<B~B~A A<_BorB<A 
continuing up continuing down 
A<B&BF-C~A<C A<B&Cf -A~C<A 
logical truth maximality logical truth top 
~/ A ~ A < B f or some B B <_ A f or every B ~ F- A 
nonelement minimality nonelement bottom 
t (~L~(AEKc*B<A t (#L~(ACKc~A<B 
for  some B) for  every B) 
n-acyclicity n-circle 
AI < A2 & A2 < A3 & ... A1 <<_ Az or A2 <_ A3 0r 
& A~-I < A~ ~ A~ ~ A~ A7~-1 <_ A,~orAT~ <_ AI 
set non-covering set dominance 
O% t t f -  A~ A ~ B 07s HP  A~ B < A 
for  souse B in H for some B in H 
singleton on-covering singleton dominance 
BPA~A~B B~-A~B<_A 
(non-covering) conjunctiveness (dominant) conjunctiveness 
AAB<A~AAB~B A<AABorB<AAB 
conjunctive closure up conjunctive choice down 
A<t3&A<C~A<BAC AAB<C~A<CorB<C 
entaihnent closure up entailment choice down 
A < 13 for  every t3 in tt ~O& ~ #t tF -  13&B<_ A 
tt ~- C ~ A < C C < ,4 f or some C in H 
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A synopsis of some relevant conditions for relations and their converse 
complement is given in Table I. Note that the condition of virtual connectiv- 
ity used in Alchourrrn and Makinson (1985) is, on a contrapositive r ading, 
exactly the condition of negative transitivity which plays a prominent role 
in social choice theory (see Sen 1982). Under some weak additional as- 
sumptions, it is equivalent to the conditions of modularity, rankedness, or 
transitivity of ~ (defined by A ~ B iff neither A < /3 nor/3 < A) which 
were used by other authors (cf. Lewis 1981, Section 5, Ginsberg 1986, Sec- 
tion 4.4, Lehmarm and Magidor 1990, Section 3.6, Makinson 1990, Section 
4.1). 
The postulates and definition of standard epistemic entrenchment rewritten 
for the converse complement < of <_ 
(SEE1) If A < B then A < C or C < B (Virtual Connectivity) 
(SEE2) If B ~- A then A ~ B (Singleton Non-covering) 
(SEE3) If A A B < A then A A B ~ B (Conjuncfiveness) 
(SEE4) If K ~ L then: B < A for some B iff A E [~" (Minimality) 
(SEE5) If ~/A then A </3  for some B (Maximality) 
(Def<) becomes 
(Def<) A<B iff BEK-AA/3and~AAB.  
(Def-)  does not change. In order to reconcile what is intuitively natural 
(transitivity, but not connectivity) with what is effective in mechanisms for 
belief revision we shall work with strict relations in the rest of this paper. 
5. BELIEF CHANGE AND EPISTEMIC ENTRENCHMENT: A MORE 
FLEXIBLE THEORY 
The major changes of the standard theory to be made have already been 
announced at some length. We are going to get rid of (K-4)  and (K-8)  for 
contractions, and of (SEE1), (SEFA) and (SEE5) for epistemic entrenchment. 
We have to investigate what conditions, if any, must appear in their place in 
order make belief contractions work. 
First of all, we shall have to make some minor but decisive changes to every 
part of the standard theory: to the postulates for contractions and epistemic 
entrenchment as well as to the bridging principles (Def<) and (Def-).  To 
make these minor changes more comprehensible, wenote that in the narrower 
context of the standard theory, they would constitute no changes at all. 
Lemma 2 (i) Given (K - l )  - (K-6),  each of the following conditions is 
equivalent to (K-7): 
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(K-7r) If K-A  ~ K and K -B  ~ K then K-A  N K ' -B  C_ K -A  A B 
(K-P) I fAEK ' -AABthenAcK-AABAC 
(K=7p) I fACK-AAB%KthenACK-AABAC 
(ii) Given (SEE1), (SEE2) and (SEE3) taken together are equivalent to set 
non-covering, 
(SNC) I f0~H~-AthenA~BforsomeBinH 
Given (SEE1) and (SEE2), (SNC) is equivalent to entailment closure up, 
(ECU) I fA<H~0andH~-BthenA<B 
(iii) Given (K- l ) ,  (K=4) and (Def<), we have 
A<B iff B c K -AABandA ~ K-AAB.  
Moreover, given (K-1) - (K-8) and (Def<), we have 
(B E K -AandA ~ K-B)~ A < B ~ B c K :A .  
(iv) Given (SEE1) - (SEE5) and (Def-), we have 
K-A={ KK N { B " A < A V B } otherwiseifAcKandA<T 
"A < H" in the condition (ECU) of course means that A < C for every 
C in H. Essentially (K-P) is first mentioned as "partial antitony" in AI- 
chourr6n, G~irdenfors and Makinson (1985) and the transcription of (SNC) 
for the converse complement ~ of < is first mentioned in Rott (1991b). In 
the standard account, then, we have a number of equivalent forms of the 
definitions used. The equivalences, however, depend on presumptions we 
would like to give up, viz. on (K-4) and (K "-8) or on (SEE1), (SEE4) and 
(SEE5). We find that he standard efinitions do not suit our purposes, but we 
shall be able to use the variants. 
Postulates for preferential contractions (over K) 
(K - l )  
(K=2) 
(K-3) 
(K=5) 
(K-6) 
(K-7p) 
(K=7c) 
(K-8c) 
K-A  is a theory 
K-A  C K 
I fA  ~ K then K-A  = K 
K C_ (K -A)  + A 
If Cn(A) : Cn(B) then K-  A = K -  B 
I fAcK-AABandK-AAB%K,  thenAEK=AABAC.  
I fBEK-AABthenK-ACK-AAB.  
If B E K -A  A B then K-A  A B C K :A .  
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At least for (K -  1) and (K-5)  it is again essential that they are restricted to the 
case where/4 is a theory. The "c" in " (K-7c)"  and "(K-8c)"  stands for cu- 
mulative, or cut and cautious monotony, the "p" in " (K-7p)"  for preferential 
or partial antitony. 
A few comments on the motivation of these postulates are in order. First, 
we removed the success postulate (K -4)  which is related to the maximality 
postulate (SEE5). We allow a reasoner to refuse the withdrawal of A not only 
in the case where A is a logical truth. There may well be other sentences 
("necessary truths") which are of topmost importance for him. (K-2)  and 
(K -5)  imply 
If A E K-  A then K:  A = K. 
This is a weak form of (K -4)  and all what we want and need. Notice inci- 
dentally that (K-1)  - (K-3)  and (K-5)  imply that 
K-A  = K if and only if A ~ 14" or A E K-A .  
This fact will be useful for the proof of Theorem 2(iv) below. 
Well, what do the new conditions which replace G[irdenfors's supplemen- 
tary postulates ay? The conjunction of (K-7c)  and (K-8c)  tells us that if 
a reasoner who is instructed to withdraw A A B (i.e., to withdraw at least 
one of A and B) does not withdraw B then what he does is just withdraw 
A. This seems plausible enough. It is worth mentioning that (K-7c)  and 
(K-8c)  taken together are equivalent to the following reciprocity condition 
for contractions: 
(REC) If A--* B E I ( -  B and B--~ A E K = A then I ( -  A = K -  B. 
Proof: From (K-7c)  and (K-8c)  to (REC): Let A--~B E K--/3 = 
K- (A -+B)  A (A V B). Then (K-7c)  and (K-8c)  allow us to conclude 
K-B  = K' -A  V B, and similarly we get K-A  K -A  V B. From 
(REC) to (K-7c)  and (K-8c):  Let /3 E K-A  A /3. Then, by (K - l ) ,  
A~(A A/3)  E K -  A A/3.  Moreover, by (K - l ) ,  (A A B)--~A E K "-A. 
So [ ( -A  A B = K -A ,  by (REC). (Cf. Gardenfors 1988, pp. 57,65, Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor 1990, p. 179, Makinson and G~denfors 1991, p. 198.) 
(K-7p)  tells us that if a reasoner who is instructed to withdraw A A B 
(i.e., to withdraw at least one of A and /3) does not withdraw A then he 
or she will not withdraw A when instructed to remove A A B A C (i.e., to 
withdraw at least one of A, /3 and C) - provided that he does not simply 
refuse to withdraw A A/3. It may happen, however, that the reasoner refuses 
to withdraw A A B but does not refuse to withdraw A A B A C, and after 
withdrawing A A B A C A is missing in his belief state. (K "-7p) implies a 
restricted form of (K-7),  viz. 
(K-7r)  If K-  A ~ I(  and K -  B ~ It" then K "-A fq l ( - /3  C I ( -  A A/3 
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(modify the proof of Observation 3.3 in Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors and Ma- 
kinson 1985 accordingly), but in the absence of (K-4)  it does not imply 
full (K-7),  nor does it imply the weaker (K-7c). As conversely (K "-7c) 
does not entail (K-7p), we in fact split up (K-7)  into two weaker versions 
which do not even jointly imply (K-7).  Unrestricted (K-7)  may fail in our 
more liberal context for the following reason. It may happen that somebody 
refuses to withdraw A and refuses to withdraw B, but he or she does not 
refuse to withdraw A A B. This does not match well with our idea that 
withdrawing A A B is the same as withdrawing at least one of A and B, 
but after all in withdrawing A A B the reasoner is at liberty to choose freely 
between withdrawing A and withdrawing B, and that may facilitate the act 
of withdrawing. Anyway, we will see which role of the various versions of 
(K-7)  play in the following. 
Note that with the exception of (K-" 7p), we are left with Horn conditions 
only. Had we replaced (K-Tp) by (K=7) or (K-" P), we would have the pleas- 
ant fact that the intersection of any set of preferential contraction functions is 
again a preferential contraction function. It is clear that (K-" 8) is not derivable 
from our new set of postulates. 
Postulates for generalized epistemic entrenchment 
(GEE1) T ~ T (Non-Triviality) 
(GEE2 T) If A < B and B k C then A < C (Continuing Up) 
(GEE2;) If A < B and C ~- A then C < B (Continuing Down) 
(GEE3?) If A < B and A < C then A < B A C (Conjunction Up) 
(GEE3+) If A A B < B then A < B (Conjunction Down) 
Let us look at the motivation of (GEE1)-(GEE3;). (GEE1) is not prob- 
lematic. (GEE2?) says that if A is more exposed to the danger of being 
withdrawn, or more risky for short, than B, and if B implies C, then A is 
more risky than C. Loosely speaking, a decrease of logical content always 
involves a decrease of risk. Similarly, (GEE2 +) says that if A is more risky 
than B and C implies A, then C is more risky than B. An increase of logical 
content always involves an increase of risk. Continuing Up and Continuing 
Down appear in Alchourrdn and Makinson (1985, 1986), and I take them as 
minimal conditions of rationality for every relation designed to formalize the 
concept of epistemic entrenchment. 
The conjunctiveness conditions (GEE3?) and (GEE3;) which replace the 
standard conjunctiveness condition (SEE3) rest on the following intuition. 
As already mentioned, it is both necessary and sufficient to withdraw either 
A or B (or both) from a belief set K in order to withdraw A A B from K. 
Indeed, it is hardly conceivable what a difference there should be between an 
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intention or instruction to withdraw A A B and an intention or instruction to 
withdraw at least one of A and B, with afree choice which of the conjuncts to 
withdraw. In the following, our guiding hypothesis that a contraction with 
respect to a conjunction just is the same as a (finite) choice contraction (this 
term is due to Fuhrmann 1988). But be cautious. This does not entail that the 
result of withdrawing A A B is identical with either the result of withdrawing 
A or the result of withdrawing B or some straightforward combination of 
these (cf. condition ( -V)  of Alchourr6n, G~denfors and Makinson 1985). 
We should reckon with the possibility that the simultaneous withdrawal of 
both A and B is done in a way essentially different from the withdrawal of the 
single sentences. Now let us turn to the discussion of our postulates. (GEE3 T) 
says that if A is more risky than both B and C then it is also more risky than 
the conjunction/3 A C. If A is given up and B is retained when at least one 
of A and B must be given up, and if A is given up and C is retained when at 
least one of A and C must be given up, then A is given up and B and C are 
retained when at least one of A, B and C must be given up. (GEE3$) says 
that if A A B is more risky than B then so is A alone. If A A B is given up 
and B is retained when at least one of A A B and B - i.e., at least one of 
A and B! - must be given up, then A is given up and B is retained when at 
least one of A and B must be given up. It will turn out soon that (GEE37) and 
(GEE3$) are very powerful postulates. 
Obviously, (GEE3$) is only a restricted form of the dual of (GEE3T), viz. 
i fAAB < CthenA < CorB  < C. 
This condition follows from (SEE1) and (SEE3) in standard epistemic en- 
trenchment. I  says that if A A B - i.e., at least one of A and B - is given up 
and C is retained when at least one of A A B and C - i.e., at least one of A and 
B and C-  has to be given up, then either A is given up and C is retained when 
at least one of A and C has to be given up, or B is given up and C is retained 
when at least one of B and C is to be given up. This seems reasonable, given 
our interpretation f conjunction contractions as choice contractions. Let us 
illustrate why we still do not want to accept his condition. 
Imagine we are working on the basis of a fictitious miniature medical 
theory. People are either healthy or ill. Their physical condition is entirely 
dependent on their being supplied with the right amount of minerals and 
proteins. There are exactly two indicators of somebody's health, namely 
blood pressure and pulse. Now normally, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, if people are ill, they suffer from a lack rather than from an excess, of 
either minerals or proteins. Deficiencies are not very dangerous fortunately, 
but they cause certain symptoms. If you need more minerals, the blood 
pressure is all right, but the frequency of the pulse is much too low. If you 
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need more proteins, the pulse is all right, but the blood pressure is much too 
high. Sometimes, though, people comsume too much minerals or proteins. 
As it happens, the symptoms of an excessive consumption of minerals are 
exactly like those of a deficiency of proteins, and the symptoms of an excessive 
consumption of proteins are exactly like those of a deficiency of minerals. But 
beware - excessive consumption is always a serious danger to the patient's 
life! Now the person we take care of is Henry, and we use the following 
symbols: 
A : Henry's blood pressure is all right. 
B : Henry's pulse is all right. 
C : There is no serious danger to Henry's life. 
Our present theory E about Henry says that he is very well, i.e. E- contains 
A, B and C. But then Henry feels sick. Something, at least one of A, B and 
G', seems to be wrong. Fortunately we need not worry about Henry too much, 
because presumably he suffers from a deficiency desease, so he is not very ill, 
regardless of whether his mineral or protein balance is disturbed. Formally, 
this should mean that C 6 K - (A  A B A C), or A A B < C. But if his blood 
pressure seems to be very high (while the pulse is still normal), we may be 
worried. For one possible reason for a high blood pressure is that he has too 
high a level of minerals, which would indeed mean a serious threat o his life. 
And similarly, if his pulse seems to be very low (while the blood pressure is 
still normal), we may again be worried. For one possible reason now is that 
Henry has too high a level of proteins, which would again be very serious. 
This kind of informational situation may occur in particular when we do not 
have any idea about he probability of a disturbance of the minaral metabolism 
as compared to the probability of a disturbance of the protein metabolism. The 
ratio of these probabilites might be 1000 to 1, or 1 to 1000. Formally, it seems 
that we are now ready to assent to C r K -  (A A C) and C ~ K -  (B A C), or 
A g C and B ~ C. (Warning: We do not wish to convey the impression that 
we depend on probability considerations too badly! For instance, (GEE31") can 
only be made sense of in probabilistic terms if we countenance nonstandard 
numbers as values of probability distributions. It is just that the A A ~B A C- 
worlds are more plausible that the --,A A B A -,C-worlds and the ~A A B A C- 
worlds are more plausible than the A A -,B A -,C-worlds - and this is all we 
know.) 
In so far as the above line of reasoning is correct, at least as a representation 
of some cases of application, we had better eject the dual of (GEE3 I") as a 
valid pattern of epistemic entrenchment. 
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Notice that (GEE1) - (GEE3~) leave us with Horn conditions only. As a 
consequence of this, we have the pleasant fact that the intersection of any set 
of GEE-relations is again a GEE-relation. This will help us in the discussion 
of relational belief change in the style of Lindstr~m and Rabinowicz (1991). 
Another immediate consequence is that the union of any non-empty chain of 
GEE-relations is again a GEE-relation. This fact will be useful in the proof 
of Lemma 7 below. 
Notice also that in (GEE 1) - (GEE3 +) no mentioning is made of a specific 
belief set K. Epistemic entrenchment relations are no longer epistemic en- 
trenchment relations with respect to a given theory K. Given a GEE-relation, 
on the other hand, one can obtain different "current heories", according to the 
requirements of reliability and relevance in a given context. This can be done 
by choosing a "greatest lower bound" A which just fails to be considered ac- 
ceptable in that context. Then define SA = {B: A < B}. SA is a theory (see 
(GEE t) in Lemma 3 below), and it is a theory with respect o a given GEE- 
relation <. In the standard theory, we invariably have K -- S• (First steps 
of considering epistemic entrenchment relations as primary epistemological 
entities were made in Rott 1991b.) 
Since < is transitive (see Lemma 4(v) below) SA is an up-set, where an up- 
set S with respect to some relation < is a collection of objects uch that if A is 
in S and A < B then B is in S. Up-sets have a number of nice properties, and 
they are in fact discussed under different names ("cuts", "fallbacks", "filters") 
as a means for the direct definition of belief contractions by K-A  = SA in 
Rott (1991a) and Lindstrtm and Rabinowicz (1991). On the other hand, up- 
set contractions notoriously violate the recovery postulate (K-5)  - a fact 
which may be taken to disqualify them for belief contraction. We shall see, 
however, that up-sets are well suited for performing belief revision. 
For many purposes it will be expedient to make use of a more economic, 
although less symmetrical, set of postulates. 
Lemma 3 The conjunction of (GEE2?) and (GEE3~) is equivalent to 
(GEE?) if A < H and H F B for a non-empty, finite set H, then A < B 
(Closure Up) 
The conjunction of (GEE2;) and (GEE3+) is equivalent to 
(GEE+) if A < B and C F B--,A then C < B (Closure Down) 
GEE-relations are characterizable as relations over L • L satisfying 
(GEE1), (GEE?) and (GEE;). Notice that due to the compactness of Cn, we 
could equivalently have deleted the restriction of the antecedent of (GEET) to 
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finite sets H. We choose not to do so, because we will appeal to the finitary 
character of (GEET) in the proof of Theorem 3below. 
Lemma 4 (Properties of GEE-relations) 
(i) If A < B and F- A~.-~A t and b B~--~B I then A t < B t 
t 
(ii) A ~ A 
(iii) I fAAC<BACthenA<B 
(iv) I fA<BandC<DthenAAC<BAD 
(v) I fA<BandB <CthenA<C 
(vi) A<AVBi f fAv - - ,B<AVB 
Observe that clauses (ii) and (v) state that < is a strict partial order. It 
remains to verify that every SEE-relation is a GEE-relation. 
Lemma 5 SEE-relations are GEE-relations, or more specifically, (SEE1) 
- (SEE3) imply (GEE1) - (GEE3$); conversely, (GEE1) - (GEE3$) imply 
(SEE2) - (SEE3) and (SNC), but not (SEE1), nor (SEE4) or (SEE5). 
Let us consider asimple example that shows the possible failure of virtual 
connectivity (SEE 1) and rational monotony (K-8).  Let L be the propositional 
language with two atoms A and B and let Cn be classical propositional 
logic. Let the following facts about < be given: A V B < T, A V -,B < T, 
~A V B < T, and A < A V B. The most relevant piece of information is 
the last one. By (GEE$), it allows us to deduce that every sentence which 
entails A V ~B is less entrenched than A V B. We confine our attention 
to < restricted to K = Cn(A  A B): see Figure 1. Note that this already 
exploits the whole power of (GEE1), (GEE?) and (GEE;). In particular, 
nothing allows us to derive either A < B or B < A V B from the given 
information. So the smallest GEE-relation < of which the initial infomation 
is true does not satisfy virtual connectivity (SEE1). This fact is mirrored 
by the failure of (K-8)  in this example. We have K-A  A B = {C E 
K :  AAB < (AAB)  VC} = Cn(AV B) , so  B ~ K -AAB,  but 
K -  B = {C E K :  B < BV C} = Cn(A  V--~B).Thus K -  AA  B ~ K -  B. 
We also consider some supplementary postulates for generalized epistemic 
entrenchment. Unlike (GEE1) - (GEE3;), they should not be regarded as 
constitutive of the concept of epistemic entrenchment. 
(GEE4) I fKCLthen:_ l _  <A i f fAEK 
(GEE4 t) I fAEKandB ~KthenB<A 
(GEE5) If ~/A then A < T 
(GEE50 I fA<TandB~TthenA<B 
(Minimality) 
(K-Representation) 
(Maximality) 
(Top Equivalence) 
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AAB 
aV la - ,A v B 
B ['i'] 9 ",/Y" 
(~)" "< A vB"  
Fig. 1. Example showing the failure of (SEE1) and (K - 8). 
Given (GEE21") and (GEE2+), the minimality and maximality conditions 
(GEFA) and (GEE5) are obviously equivalent to(SEE4) and (SEE5). (GEE4) 
and (GEE4 I) are theory-relative, (GEEY) is non-Hom. (GEE4) and (GEFA') 
will hold for the redefined E("--) and in particular for E(C(<)). As we shall see 
later, (GEE5) corresponds to (K-4), (GEE5 I) corresponds to full (K "--7). In 
the presence of virtual connectivity, (GEE4 I) follows from (GEE4). Observe 
that the correspondence b tween GEE-relations and theories expressed in 
(GEE4') is many-many: in general, aGEE-relation represents many different 
theories and a theory is represented bymany different GEE-relations. (GEE51) 
is a special case of virtual connectivity, with T involved in the antecedent. 
From (GEE1) - (GEE3$) and (GEE51), it follows that if A ~ T and B ~ T 
then A A B ~ 7-. (Proof: Assume that A A B < T and A ~ T; then (GEE5/) 
yields A A B < A, so/3 < A, by (GEE3+), so/3 < T, by (GEE2?).) It is 
because (GEE5 ~) is non-Hom and because there is no independent motivation 
for it in the concept of epistemic entrenchment that we exclude (GEE5') from 
the set of basic postulates. 
It is time to turn to the crucial connection between GEE-relations and 
contraction operations in belief change. 
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From preferential contractions to generalized epistemic entrenchment 
(Def<) A<B iff BcK=AABandA~K-AAB.  
From generalized epistemic entrenchment to preferential contractions 
K -A= ~ K N {B" A < Av  B} i fA  E KandA < T 
(Def-) 
L K otherwise 
(Def<) is amenable to a "revealed preference" interpretation common in 
the general theory of choice and preference (see e.g. the "base preferences" 
in Herzberger 1973). In withdrawing A A B from his current belief set, a 
reasoner has the obligation to give up at least one of A and B, but also the 
choice between A and B. If he chooses to withdraw A while retain B then A 
is preferred to B under a preference r lation of riskiness or vulnerability, or, 
put differently, B is preferred to A under a preference r lation of epistemic 
entrenchment. 
(Def'-) would be more straightforward if its crucial phrase were "A < B" 
instead of "A < A V B". The disjunction is present mainly in order to 
guarantee satisfaction of the recovery postulate (K "-5). By Lemma 4(vi), 
A < A V B is equivalent to ~A---~--,B < ~A--~B. Thus we can understand 
the principal case of (Def'-) in the following way. Sentence B is in the 
contraction of K with respect to A if and only if B is in K and B under the 
condition ~A is better entrenched than ~B under the condition --,A. Roughly, 
retaining B in K ' -A  means believing that B is true even if it were the case 
that ~A is true. 
From now on, E('-) and C(<) refer to the epistemic entrenchment rela- 
tions and contractions defined by the new definitions (Def<) and (Def ' ) ,  
respectively. Note that the contraction function defined in (Def'-) is not only 
dependent on < but also on a belief set K. That is, (Def- )  specifies the 
contractions of K for every belief set K. 
Our main observation reproduces the results of Gardenfors and Makinson 
(1988) in the more flexible setting: 
Theorem 2 (i) If < satisfies (GEE1) - (GEE3 ;) then C(<) satisfies 
(K-1)  - (K-" 3), (K "-5), (K-" 6), (K-7p), (K-7c) and (K-" 8c). If in addition 
< satisfies (GEE5) then C(<) satisfies (K-4); if < satisfies (GEEY) then 
C(<) satisfies (K-7).  
(ii) If "- satisfies (K-" 1) - (K-3),  (K-5),  (K'-6), (K-7p), (K-7c)  and 
(K-8c)  then E( - )  satisfies (GEE1) - (GEE4) and (GEE4'). If in addition -
satisfies (K-4)  then E( - )  satisfies (GEE5); if "- satisfies (K-7)  then E( - )  
satisfies (GEE5~). 
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(iii) If < satisfies (GEE1) - (GEE3+) then E(C(<)) restricted to K is identical 
with < restricted to K. More exactly, with <* = E(C(<)): 
A<*B iff BEK&(A~KorA<B) .  
If < satisfies (GEE1) - (GEE4), and (GEE#) then E(C(<)) = <. 
(iv) If - satisfies (K - l )  - (K-3) ,  ~ (K-5)  and (K-6)  then C(E(- ) )  = - .  
Two comments. First, we see in parts (ii) and (iii) that every GEE-relation 
< which "comes from" a contraction function over a theory K is also related 
to K, viz. by (GEE4) and (GEE4'). An epistemic entrenchment relation < 
derived from - over K cannot encode information about sentences outside 
of K, just because -" does not care at all about these sentences. Secondly, 
it is surprising that part (iv) does not depend on any supplementary postu- 
late for contractions. Every contraction function - which satisfies the basic 
G~irdenfors postulates (except (K-4))  admits the (re-)construction f a rela- 
tion < = E( - )  which is suitable for application in (Def'-) salva contractione, 
even if we cannot derive any of the GEE-postulates for < (except (GEE1)). 
There is one result of Gardenfors and Makinson (1988) for SEE-relations 
which does not hold true for GEE-relations. When a theory K is finite modulo 
Cn, every SEE-relation over K is fully determined by its own restriction to 
the set of coatoms of K (the logically weakest elements of K - Cn(O)). 
This is not true for GEE-relations. As a counterexample, consider I f  = 
Cn(A A B) and a GEE-relation < of which we just know that no element of 
{AVB, AV-~B, --,AVB} is better entrenched than any other. This information 
is compatible with A < -,A V B, as well as with A g -~A V B. 
We close this section with a word about revisions. Following the Levi 
identity, GEE-revisions are defined as K 9 A = (K -~A)  + A = (K N {B : 
-,A < --A V B}) + A for sentences A such that -,A E K and -~A < T, and 
K 9 A = K + A otherwise. It is easily verified (cf. Section 5 of Rott 1991a 
where the proof is carried through for SEE-relations) that this is equivalent 
to the up-set revision 
(Def,) K 9 A = ~ (K 1"1 S-,A) q- A if -~A E K and ~A < T 
( K + A otherwise 
(Recall that S-,A = {B : --,A < B}.) Thus GEE-relations provide us with an 
extremely convenient method of revising beliefs. 
GEE-revisions according to (Def,) violate G~irdenfors's consistency 
preservation postulate saying that K 9 A must be consistent whenever A 
is. This corresponds to the violation of the "success postulate" (K "-4) for 
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contractions. Altematively, we could think of a reasoner who obeys consis- 
tency preservation but may sometimes refuse to revise his belief set. This 
can be modelled by restricting the Levi identity to cases where the initial 
contraction is successful (i.e., where -~A < T), and putting K 9 A = K 
otherwise. 
6. FUNCTIONAL AND RELATIONAL BELIEF CHANGE 
Belief change in the above sense is functional in that it produces, for every 
belief set K and every sentence A, exactly one revised belief set K-A .  Lind- 
str6m and Rabinowicz (1991) have advocated the idea of relational belief 
revision. If a theory is to be changed in response to new information, they 
argue, there may be more than just one rational way to do this, without any 
one of these possibilities being better than any other. This is, of course, a 
very interesting and legitimate field of examination. But in one respect we 
are not satisfied if all we know is that, say, (K -A)1 ,  (K -A)2 ,  (K -A)3 ,  
etc., are possible ways of removing A from K. One answer we would like 
to get from a model for belief revision is an answer to the question what 
we should actually do when forced to retract A. How should our epistemic 
state actually look like after retracting A? A parallel processing of multiple 
alternative revisions seems to be psychologically unrealistic and computa- 
tionally impossible, at least if iterated belief changes are taken into account. 
So the most reasonable advice one can get from the point of view of relational 
belief revision seems to be the sceptical one: Retain, in the actual contrac- 
tion K-A ,  only those sentences which are left unquestioned in each of the 
possible ways to perform a rational contraction, i.e., take the intersection 
(K-A)1 n (K -A)2  n (K -A)3  n ... 
Define B E f f -A  iff B E (K -A) i  for every / in some index set I. 
Assuming that each of the candidate contractions i a GEE-contraction, we 
have in the principal case 
K-A  = 
N = 
iCI 
I (  n {B :A  <i AV B for every i C I} = 
KN{B:A<AVB},  with<= n <i. 
iEI 
Since the class of all GEE-relations is closed under intersections, the result 
of every sceptical relational contraction - based on a collection of GEE- 
relations <i is identical with a simple (functional) contraction based on a 
GEE-relation, viz. on n {<i: i E I}. In particular, every sceptical relational 
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contraction based on SEE-relations can be represented asa simple contraction 
based on a GEE-relation. 
It is natural to ask a converse question. If we have a contraction based 
on some GEE-relation, can it always be represented as the "sceptical" meet 
of a multitude of SEE-contractions? This reduces to a similar question con- 
ceming the underlying relation~ of epistemic entrenchment. If we have a 
GEE-relation, can it always be represented as the meet of a suitably chosen 
set of SEE-relations extending it? Or more ambitiously, is it the case that 
every GEE-relation is the meet of all its standard extensions? 
The only thing that blocks a positive answer is the maximality condition 
(SEE5). As every standard relation of epistemic entrenchment decides A < 3- 
for A ~ Cn(~), so does every meet of SEE-relations. But we wished to drop 
this requirement for GEE-relations. In order to establish a perfect link, we 
must either drop (SEE5) for standard relations, or pass from a given GEE- 
relation < to its top extension <top _ < U {(A, B)" V A and ~- B} (which is 
again a GEE-relation). For the sake of simplicity, we take the former option 
and decide, for the rest of this section, that SEE-relations are not required 
to satisfy (SEE5). As we will make no reference to a specific theory if ,  
we may also largely neglect (SEE4). For every GEE-relation <5 0, the set 
{A 9 _1_ < A} is a consistent theory, by (GEEt), and it is easy to verify that < 
satisfies (SEE4) with respect to this set. For the trivial entrenchment relation 
<= O - as well as for every other GEE-relation - the trivial theory K = L 
will do. So we find for every GEE-relation atheory/~" which is suitable for the 
fulfilment of (SEE4), and this is all we require from the present perspective. 
The main object of interest in this section, then, is virtual connectivity (SEE 1). 
In order to achieve our task, we first address ourselves to a question 
which is interesting in itself. Suppose you have an arbitrary "base relation" 
R C_ L x L consisting of pairs of sentences (A, B) such that, intuitively 
speaking, A is epistemically ess firmly entrenched than B. How can we know 
that this base relation can serve as the foundation of a full-fledged, formal 
relation of epistemic entrenchment, in either the standard or the generalized 
sense? What we have to do is investigate whether R can be extended to a 
SEE- or GEE-relation. The following theorem tells us how to check this. 
Theorem 3 Let R be a binary relation over L. Then R can be extended 
to a GEE-relation iff it satisfies the following condition of entrenchment 
consistency: 
(EC) There is no finite set {(A1,B1),...,(An, Bn)} C_ R such that 
B1 A. . .  A Bn t- A1 A . . .  A An. 
(Cf. Rott 1991b, Observation 3 and Definition 12.) Let us say that a binary 
relation R over L is entrenchment consistent, or simply consistent, if it can 
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be extended to a GEE-relation over L. For any GEE-relation <, we say that 
a pair (A, B) is consistent with < iff < O {(A, B)} is consistent, otherwise 
we say that (A, B> is inconsistent with <. We then have the following useful 
Lemma 6 A pair (A, B) is inconsistent with a GEE-relation < iff B < 
B---~A. 
For the next lemma, we use the fact that L is supposed to be a countable 
language. 
Lemma 7 Every GEE-relation can be extended to a SEE-relation. 
An immediate corollary of Theorem 3 and Lemma 7 is 
Lemma 8 Let R be a binary relation over L. Then R can be extended to 
a SEE-relation iff it satisfies the condition of entrenchment consistency. 
At last it is no longer difficult o show that our aim can by achieved. 
Theorem 4 Every GEE-relation is the meet of all SEE-relations (which 
are not required to satisfy (SEE5)) extending it. 
This result is similar to Lindstr6m and Rabinowicz's (1991) Theorem 
3.14. Due to different formalizations of epistemic entrenchment, however, 
our proof is entirely different from the proof given there. 
7. BELIEF CONTRACTION MODELS 
The Alchourr6n-Gardenfors-Makinson approach considers contraction func- 
tions over a fixed belief set K. Accordingly, the standard theory of epistemic 
entrenchment studies relations which are likewise related to some fixed be- 
lief set/s" - witness condition (SEE4). Our theory relieves us of this depen- 
dency. We can use one and the same GEE-relation < for treating contractions 
C(<, K) of various belief sets [~" rather than just one C(<) for a fixed K. In 
particular, it is possible to model iterated changes of belief. The information 
encoded in a GEE-relation exceeds the information encoded in a contraction 
function over some fixed consistent K. It is rather equivalent to a family 
of contraction functions, one contraction function for every belief set i f ,  or, 
to put it differently, to a belief contraction model. Here a belief contraction 
model is meant o be a pair (/C,->, where/C is a non-empty set of belief sets 
and - : /C  • L ~ /C is a function assigning to every belief set [~ in/C and 
every sentence A a unique contraction I('-:-A in 1C. (Belief revision models 
are discussed by Gardenfors and others in the context of Ramsey test inter- 
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pretations of conditionals. Also cf. Alchourr6n and Makinson 1985, Section 
7.) 
It is worthwhile to take down some of the most basic properties of the 
belief contraction models generated by GEE-relations. Obviously, we have 
K=A=~ Kfq(L -A)  i fAEKandA<T 
L K otherwise 
So after all it tums out that all we need to know for the contraction of 
an arbitrary belief set K is how to contract he "absurd theory" L. Belief 
contraction models reduce to single contraction functions over L. Note that 
the recovery postulate (K-5)  for L means that -~A has to be in L-A. For 
the absurd theory L, contraction with respect to A coincides with revision by 
~A. The other postulates for preferential contractions do not seem to have 
a particularly interesting special impact on the contraction of L. (K -2)  and 
(K -3)  are trivial for K = L. 
The standard equation/s = S• receives a new interpretation from this 
perspective. For any non-empty GEE-relation <, S• = L -L .  Hence on 
the standard account, K = L- J_ .  This means that the standard "current 
theory" K entertained by an epistemic subject may be regarded as the result 
of removing inconsistency from the multiplicity of informations he or she has 
received - and in practice this multiplicity is very likely to be inconsistent. 
We have a qualified monotony principle for contractions: If K C_ K / and 
A E K then K-A  C_ KI-A. Although this seems to be quite reasonable, it 
has to be checked against intuitive examples. G~rdenfors (1988, pp. 59-60 
and 65) argues against an unqualified principle of monotony (viz., if [( C_ I~ "~ 
then K-A  _C K~-A),  and the counterexample h puts forward is in fact a 
case where A ~ K. For a discussion of the significance of this unqualified 
principle, see Katsuno and Mendelson (1992) and Morreau and Rott (1991). 
Now consider iterated contractions. It is easy to verify that (K -A) -B  ---- 
ff=A N K-B ,  unless B ~ K-A ,  or more precisely, unless A E K, A < 7- 
and A ;~ A V B. In the latter case, (K -A) -B  = K-A .  It is this case 
(and its analogue for (K -B) -A)  which blocks the satisfaction of the order 
independence ondition (K -  A) - B = ( / ( -  B ) -  A. 
8. CONCLUSION 
This paper has made a step towards the justification of the claim that with 
epistemic entrenchment one can do anything which can be done by other 
established methods of belief change - even if one does not accept he entire 
set of the GRrdenfors postulates. We have removed three unwelcome restric- 
tions, viz. virtual connectivity, minimality and maximality, from the theory of 
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epistemic entrenchment asdeveloped by Gardenfors and Makinson. Our gen- 
eralized relation conforms to the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment spelled 
out in the introduction (cf. (Def-)),  and it permits the same kind of simple 
construction of belief contractions and revisions as the more demanding 
relation of Gardenfors and Makinson (cf. (Def<) and (Def.)). 
Besides epistemic entrenchment contractions, a number of other methods 
for constructing contractions have been propounded in the literature. It is an 
interesting task to check which of the postulates for preferential contractions 
are satisfied by which of these constructions. In particular it is natural to 
ask about he systematic value of the rather new postulate (K-8c).  Another 
idea is to extract directly a relation of epistemic entrenchment from the 
informational basis of these alternative methods. For safe contractions in the 
sense of Alchourrtn and Makinson (1985, 1986), relevant work has been 
done in Rott (1992). For partial meet contractions without transitivity of 
the underlying non-strict relations (see Alchourrtn, Ggrdenfors and Makin- 
son 1985), it seems promising to generalize the account of Rott (1991a). 
For full meet contractions of theory bases (see Veltman 1976, Kratzer 1981, 
Lewis 1981), it seems clear that epistemic entrenchment reconstructions are 
possible only if satisfaction of the recovery postulate (K--" 5) is guaranteed in
a somewhat artificial way (cf. Nebel 1989). Still another undertaking is the 
invention of a semantics for belief contraction. More specifically, one may 
look for a semantics in the style of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990), 
which bears an intimate relation to the theory of partial meet contractions of 
Alchourrtn, Gardenfors and Makinson. However, all of these projects require 
too much care and elaboration to be addressed here even in outline. 
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APPENDIX: PROOFS 
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that (K'--1) - (K -6)  and the Levi identity hold. 
It is proven in Gardenfors (1988), Theorem 3.3, that (K-7)  is equivalent to 
(Dis) and (K-8)  is equivalent to (RM). We prove the rest. 
(Cut) is equivalent to (K-7c)." Using the Levi identity, we see that (Cut) 
says 
If B C (K -~A)  +A and C E (K - -~AV~B)+AABthen C C 
+ A. 
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Switching the negations of A and B and applying the deduction theorem 
for Cn, we get that this is 
(*) I fAV-~BEK ' -AandAVBVCEK-AVBthenAVCEK-A .  
To show that (*) implies (K-7c), assume that D E K-D A E and 
F E K -E .  We need to show that F E K-D A E. By (K- l ) ,  we have 
(DAE)  V (DV-~E)  E K -DAE.  So, by (*), if (DAE)  V4(9V 
-,E) V C E K "-(D A E)  V --,(D V -,E) then (D A E) V C E K -  D A E. 
Since (D A E) V =(D V --E) is logically equivalent with E, we have that 
i fEVC E K-Ethen  (D AE)  V C E K-D A E. Nowby F E K-E  
and (K "-1), E V F E K-E .  So (D A E) V F E K-D A E. But by (K "-2), 
F E K, so by (K-5), (D A E)- - ,F  E K -D  A E as well. Hence, by (K- l ) ,  
FEK-DAE.  
TO show that conversely (K-" 7c) implies (*), assume that A V--B E KmA 
and AVBVC E KmAVB.  We haveto showthat AVC E KmA.  By (KIn6), 
A V -~B E K - (A  V B) i (A V -~B). So, by (K-7c), K ' -A  V B c K -A .  
Thus A V B V C C K -A .  But also A V =B E K-A .  Thus, by (K'-I), 
AVCEK' - -A .  
(CM) is equivalent to (K'-8c)." Applying the Levi identity, switching the 
negations of A and B and using the deduction theorem for Cn, we see that 
(CM) says 
(**) If A V -~B E K ' -A  and A V C E K -A  then A V B V C E K-A  V B. 
To show that (**) implies (K-8c), assume that D E K'--D A E and 
F E K -D  A E. We need to show that F E K-E .  Proceding as in the case 
of (Cut) and (K "-7c), we get by using (**): If (D A E) V C E K ' -D  A E 
thenEVCEK-E .  NowFEK-DAE,  so (DAE)  VFEK ' -DAE,  
so E V F E K-E .  But by (K-2) also F E K, so by (K-5) E---~F E K ' -E ,  
so, by (K - l )  again, F E K-E .  
To show that conversely (K-8c) implies (**), assume that A V -~B E 
K-  A and A V C C K "-A. Wehave to show that A V B V C E K -  A V B. By 
(K-6), AV-~B E K -  (AVB)A (AV-~B). So by (K-8c), K-A  C_ K -AVB.  
Thus A V C E K-A  V B, so by (K- I ) ,  A V B V C E K-A  V B. 
We also give direct proofs of (K -7 )~(K-7c)  and (K-8)~(K-8c) .  
(K -7)  implies (K'-Tc): Let B E K -  A A B. By (K-7) K:  A Cq K -  B C_ 
K -A  A B, hence (K -A)  + B N (K -B)  + B C_ (K -A  A B) + B. But 
by (K-2), B E K, so by (K-5), K C_ (K :B)  + B. Moreover, by B E 
K-A  A B, (K ' -A  A B) + B = K ' -A  A B, so K ' -A  = K ' -A  C2 K C_ 
(K -A)  + B N (KmB)  + B C_ K -A  A B. 
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(K -  8) implies (K -  8c): Let B E K -  A A B. By (K-4), either A A B 
K ' -A  A B or ~- A A B. In the former case, A ~ K-A  A B, by (K- l ) ,  so we 
can apply (K-8) and get K-A  A B C K -A .  In the latter case, we have k A, 
so (K - l )  and (K-5) give us K __ K-A ,  so, by (K-2), K-A  A 13 C_ K -A .  
(Note that this proof depends on (K-4).) 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Let (K-1) - (K-6) be given. 
(K -7 )  is equivalent to (K-7r)." That (K-7) implies the restricted form 
(K-" 7r) is obvious. To show that (K-7r) implies (K-" 7), suppose that K-A  = 
K. Then, by (K-4), either A 6 K or F- A. In the first case A A B r K, 
so (K-3) gives us K-A  A B = K,  so (K-7) follows from (K-2). In the 
second case we have ~- B~(A A B), so, by (K-6), K "-B = K -  A A B, and 
(K-" 7) follows trivially. The case K-B  = K is similar. 
(K -7 )  is equivalent to (K-P)." (K-P) is virtually the same as the "partial 
antitony" condition 
( -P)  (K -A)  A Cn(A)  c_ K -A  A B 
of Alchourr6n, G~denfors and Makinson (1985). That (-'P) implies (K-P) is 
immediate. To see that (K "P) implies (-P), let A t- C and C E K -A .  Thus, 
by (K-6), C C K :A  A C, so by (K-P), C C K -A  A B A C = K -A  A B, 
by (K-6) again. So the claim is identical with the claim of Observation 3.3 
of Alchourr6n et al., and we refer to the proof given there. Recovery (K-5) 
enters essentially into that proof. 
(K -P )  is equivalent to (K-Tp):  That (K-P) implies the restricted form 
(K-" 7p) is obvious. To show that (K:7p) implies (K-" P), suppose that A E 
K-AAB and K -AAB = K.  Then, by (K-4), either AA B ~ K or ~- AAB.  
In the first case, A A B A C ~ K, so A c K ' -A  A B A C follows from (K-2) 
and (K-3). In the second case, we have F- A and A E K -  A A B A C follows 
from (K-  1). 
(ii) Let (SEE1) be given. 
(SEE2)&(SEE3) is equivalent to (SNC): That (SNC) implies (SEE2) and 
(SEE3) is immediate if we put H = {B} and H = {A, B} respectively. 
It remains to show that (SEE1)- (SEE3) imply (SNC). LetO ~ H t- A. So, 
by the compactness of Cn, there are Bh . . . ,  B .  C H such that B1A... A B~ ~- 
A. So by (SEE2), A ~ B1 A.. .  A B,~. Now suppose for reductio that A < Bi 
for every i = 1, . . . ,  n. By (SEE3), we have B1 A B2 ~/31 or/31 A/32 ~ /32. 
So by A < B1 and A < B2 and (SEE1), A < B1 A B2. By (SEE3), we have 
B1 A B2 A B3 ~ B1 A B2 or B1 A/32 A/33 ~ B3. So by A < BI A/32 and 
A < B3 and (SEE1), A < B1 A B2 A Bs. By repetition of this reasoning, we 
get A </31 A ... A B,~, and we have a contradiction. 
Now let (SEE1) and (SEE2) be given. 
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(SNC) is equivalent with (ECU): To see that (SNC) implies (ECU), let 
A < H ~ ~ and H ~- B. We need to show that A < /3. But (SNC) gives us 
that B ~C for some C in H. Thus, by A < C and (SEE1), A < B. 
To see that (ECU) implies (SNC), let !3 r H F- A. We need to show that 
A ~ B for some/3 in H. Suppose for reductio that A < /3 for every/3 in 
H. Then (ECU) gives us A < A, contradicting (SEE2). 
(iii) By (Def<), we have to show that B E K -  A A B & ~/ A A B is 
equivalent to B E K -  A A B & A (~ K "-A A B, and that (B E K "-A and 
A ~ K-B)  ~(B E K -AABandA ~ K-AAB)~B E K-A .  Let 
(K - l )  and (K "-4) be given. 
B E K -AA/3  & [ /AAB isequ iva lent to  /3 E K -AAB & A 
K -A  A B: 
To see that the former implies the latter, assume that B E K -A  A B and 
A E K :AAB.  Then, by(K -1) ,  AA/3  E K -AAB,  soby (K-4), F- AAB.  
To see that the latter implies the former, assume that A ~ K-A  A B. Then 
by (K-  1) ~ A, so ~/A A B. 
Now let (K - l )  - (K-8) be given. 
(B E K -AandA ~ K-B)~(B  E [f -AABandA ~ K-AAB)~ 
B EK-A . "  
The limiting case A ~ I( is easy. So assume that A E If. Let/3 E K -A  
and A ~ K-  B. Suppose for reductio that B ~ K-  A A B. Then, by (K-8), 
K-A  A B C K -B .  By (K-5), A E K : (A - - ,B ) ,  so by (K - l )  and (K-7), 
A V B E K -A  C? K- (A - -oB)  C_ K -A  A B. So A V B E [ f -B .  But also, 
by (K-5), B---.A E K -B .  Thus, by (K- l ) ,  A E K -B ,  and we have a 
contradiction. So we have/3 E K -A  A B. Next suppose for reductio that 
also A E B2- A A /3. But then A A B E K -  A A B, so (K-4) gives us 
F- A A B, so F- A, which is incompatible with the assumption A ~ K-B ,  by 
(K-  1). 
Now let B E K -  A A B and A ~ [f - A A B. The last condition and 
(K-8) give us K-A  A B C_ K -A ,  so by the first condition B E K-A .  (We 
do not, however, get A ~ K-B . )  
(iv) If t- A then A ~ T, by (SEE2), and K-A  = K, by (Def-). If [ /A 
then K-A  = K C/ {B" A < A V B}, by (Def-). We are done if A E K 
and A < T. So assume that A ~ K, and let B E K. Since [4" is a theory, 
also A V/3 E K. Then by (SEE4) C < A V B for some C. But by (SEE4) 
again, C ~ A, hence, by (SEE1) A < A V B. So If C_ {B" A < A V B}, 
i.e., K = h" Cq {B : A < A V B} which is what we need. Now assume that 
A ~ T. For every sentence B, we have B ~- T, so by (SEE2) T ~ B. Taking 
A ~ T and T ~ B, (SEE1) gives us A ~ B, for arbitrary B. Thus, (SEE5) 
gives us ~- A, and that case we have already treated. 
Proof of Lemma 3. It is trivial that (GEE?) implies (GEE2$) and (GEE3~). 
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To show conversely that (GEE2 T) and (GEE3 t) jointly imply (GEE1"), let H 
be a non-empty, finite set of sentences such that A < H and H ~- B. The 
latter says that there are C1, . . . ,  Cn E H such that C1 A ... A Cn ~- B. By 
repeated application of(GEE3t), we get A < C~ A. . .  A Cn, and by (GEE21"), 
we get A < B. as desired. - It is trivial that (GEE+) implies (GEE2;). To 
see that it also implies (GEE3;), let A A B < B. Since A F B-- , (A A B), 
(GEE;) gives us A < B. To show conversely that (GEE2$) and (GEE3$) 
jointly imply (GEE+), let A < B and C F- B---*A. Since (B---+A) A B b A, 
(GEE2+) gives us (B--~A) A B < B, from which we get, using (GEE3;), that 
B---+A < B. But then, since C F- B---~A, (GEE2 +) finally yields C < A, as 
desired. 
P roo fo fLemma 4. (i) Immediate from (GEE2 t) and (GEE2$). 
(ii) Suppose for reductio that A < A. Then by (GEE2+), T A A < A, so 
by (GEE3 +) T < A, hence by (GEE2 T) T < T, contradicting (GEE1). 
(iii) Let A A C < B A C. By (GEE2$), A A B A C < B A C, so by (GEE3;) 
A < B A C, so by (GEE2 T) A < B. 
(iv) Le tA<BandC<D.  By(GEE2$) ,AAC<BandAAC<D.  
Hence, by (GEE3t), A A C < B A D. 
(v) Let A < B and B < C. Then, by (iv) and (GEE2t), A A B < C A B. 
So A < C, by (iii). 
(vi) From left to right: Let A < A V B. Then by (GEE+) (A V B)---~A < 
A V/3, so by (i) A V -~/3 < A V/3. From fight to left: By (GEE2;). 
Proof of Lemma 5. SEE-relations are GEE-relations: (GEE1) is implied 
by (SEE2). That (GEE t) is implied by (SEE1) - (SEE3), is stated in Lemma 
2(ii). For (GEE2+), assume that A < B and C ~- A. From the latter, we 
conclude with (SEE2) that A ~ C, so by the former and (SEE1) C < B, as 
desired. For (GEE3$), assume that A A B < B. Then, by (SEE3), A A/3 ~ A. 
Hence, by (SEE1), A < B, as desired. 
(GEE1) - (GEE3 $) imply (SEE2) - (SEE3) and (SNC) but neither (SEE1) 
nor (SEE4) nor (SEE5). For (SEE2), suppose for reductio/3 F A and A < B. 
Then by (GEE2 t) A < A, contradicting Lenuna 4(ii). For (SEE3), suppose for 
reductiothat AAB < AandAAB < B. By(GEE3t ) ,wegetAAB < AAB,  
contradicting Lemma 4(ii). For (SNC), suppose for reductio that A < H. 
Then, by H F A and (GEET), A < A, contradiction Lemma 4(ii). That GEE- 
relations do not generally satisfy (SEE4) and (SEE5) is immediate from the 
fact that <= ~ is a GEE-relation. A counterexample to (SEE1) is given in the 
text just after Lemma 5. 
Proof  of Theorem 2. (i) Let K be a theory and < satisfy (GEE1) - 
(GEE3+). 
(K - l ) :  It is trivial that K-A  is a theory i fA  ~ K or A ~ T. Otherwise, 
K -A  = K n {/3 : A < A V B }. As K is a theory, it suffices to show that 
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{/3 9 A < A V/3 } is a theory. Let A < A V Bi for every i in some index set 
[ and {Bi " i E [} ~ B. Then, by compacmess, {Bi : i E [0} F- t3 for some 
finite [0 __ [, and {A V B~ 9 i E [0} f- A V 13, so A < A V B by (GEE?), and 
we are done. 
(K -2)  and (K-3)  are obvious from (Def-).  
(K-5):  If A ~ K or A ~ T, this is obvious. So assume that A E K, 
A < T and C E K. Since Cn satisfies the deduction theorem, we have to 
show that A---+C E K-A ,  i.e.,by (Def-) ,  A--+C E K and A < AV (A-~C). 
But the former follows from the fact that C E K and K is a theory, and the 
latter follows from A < T, 7- F- A V (A - .C )  and (GEE21"). 
(K=6) follows from Lemma 40). 
(K-" 7p): Let A E K-A  A B r K.  By (Def'-) then, A A B E K and 
AAB < TandAAB < (AAB)  VA, i .e . ,by(GEE2t ) ,AAB < A. If 
K-  A A B A C = K, then A E K-  A A B A C, because A A B E K. So 
assume that K "-- A A B A C r K. Then A A B A C E K and A A B A C < T. 
We have to show that A A B A C < (A A B A C) V A, i.e., A A B A C < A. 
But this follows from A A B < A and (GEE2+). 
(K-7c):  Let 13 E K ' -A  A B and C E K ' -A .  We need to show that 
C E K -A  A B. If K ' -A  A B = K, then we are done, by C E K ' -A  and 
(Def-"). So let K-A  A B r K. Then A A B E K and A A B < q-. Now 
B E K ' -AAB says that AAB < B, so, by (GEE3;), A < B, so, by (GEE21"), 
A < T. As also A E K, C E K-A  says that A < A V C. By (GEE2+), then, 
AAB < AVC.  TogetherwithAAB < B, th isg ivesusAAB < (AVC)AB,  
by (GEE3?), so by (GEE2t) again, A A B < (A A B) V C. But this means 
that C E K-  A A B, as desired. 
(K-8c):  Let 13 E K-  A A B and C E K -  A A 13. We need to show that 
C E K ' -A .  If K-A  = K then we are done, by C E K-A  A B and (Def-"). 
So le tK -A  CK.  ThenA EKandA < T. S inceB E K-AAB c_ K, 
we have A A B E K, and A A B < T, by (GEE2+). So B E K ' -A  A 13 says 
thatAAB < 13, and C E K "-A A B says that A A B < (A A B) V C. By 
(GEE3t), then, A A B < ((A A B) V C) A B, or equivalently, by (GEE2t), 
A A B < (A V C) A B. Hence, by Lemma 4(iii), A < A V C. But this means 
that C E K ' -A ,  as desired. 
Now let < in addition satisfy (GEE5). 
(K-4):  Let ~/A. We need to show that A ~ K ' -A .  By (Def-) ,  we are 
done if A ~ K. So let A E K. Now by (GEE5) A < -1-, so by (Def-)  
K ' -A  = K C? {B 9 A < A V B}. We are ready if we have A ~ A V A. But 
this follows from parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4. 
Now let < satisfy (GEES'). 
(K-" 7): Let C E K-A  Cq K -B .  We need to show that C E K-A  A B. We 
already noted in the text that (K-7p) implies the claim whenever K-A  r K 
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and K -B  r K. So let K-A  = K (the case K ' -B  = K is similar). Then 
A r K or A ~ T. In the former case C E K ' -A  A B is immediate. So 
assume A ~ T. If K-B  = K,  then B ~ K or B ~ T. In the former case 
C E K ' -A  A B = K is immediate; in the latter case, we get A A B ~ T, as a 
consequence of (GEE51), so K-A  A B = K again follows, and the claim is 
verified. If K ' -B  r K then C E K-B  means that B < B V C. We have to 
show that A A B < (A A B) V C. Since B < T and A g T, we get B < A, 
by (GEE5'). By this and B < B V C, (GEE3 ~) gives us B < A A (B V C), 
hence, by (GEE2 T) and (GEE2+), A A B < (A A B) V C. 
(ii) Let the contraction function - over a theory K satisfy (K -  1) - (K "-3), 
(K-5),  (K "-6), (K-7p), (K-7c)  and (K-8c).  
(GEE1) is obvious from (Def<). 
(GEET): Let A < H r ~ and H ~- B. So there are B1, . . . ,  B,~ such that 
B] , . . . ,Bn  F- B and A < Bi for i = 1 , . . . ,n ,  i.e., Bi E K -A  A Bi and 
A ~ K ' -AAB i ,  foreveryi = 1,. . .  ,n. Wewantto showthat B E K ' -AAB 
andA ~ K ' -AAB.  If K -AAB i  = K forsomei, then, by A ~ K -AABi ,  
A ~ K. Hence A A Bj ~ K and, by (K'-3), K-A  A Bj = K for every 
j, so Bj E K for every j, so B E K, by (K- l ) .  Also A A B ~ K, so 
K-AAB = K,  so B E K-AAB and A ~ K -AAB,  by (K-3),  as desired. 
Now let K-  A A Bi 7 ~ K for every i. From Bi E K -  A A Bi, we conclude 
by (K-" 7p) that B~ E K-A  A B A B1 A ... A Bn, for every i, so by (K - l )  
B1A. . .ABn E K -AABAB1A. . .ABn andB E K ' -AABAB1A. . .ABn.  
By(K-8c) ,K -AABAB1A. . .AB~ C_ K -AA B, so B E K-A  A B, 
as desired. Since Bi E K "-A A Bi, (K-" 7c) gives us K "-A C K -  A A t3i, so 
since A ~ K-  A A Bi, A ~ K -  A. But since B E K "-A A B, we have with 
(K-Sc) that K-  A A B C_ K -  A. So A ~ K "-A A B, as desired. 
(GEE+): LetA < B,i.e., B E K ' -AAB andA ~ K -AAB,  and let C ~- 
B-+A. WewanttoshowthatC < B , i .e ,B  E K ' -BACandC ~ K ' -BAC.  
By (K-6), we have K-  B A C = K - (B  A C A (B--.A)) = K ' -A  A B A C, 
so we have to show thatB E K ' -AABACandC ~ K -AABAC.  If 
K -AAB = K thenA ~ K, sinceA ~ K ' -AAB,  so AAB A C ~ K, 
by (K - l ) ,  so K-A  A B A C = K, by (K-" 3), so B E K ' -A  A B A C. If 
K-  A A B r K then, by (K-" 7p), B E K-  A A B A C. Now suppose for 
reductio that also C E K-A  A B A C. By (K-8c), then C E K ' -A  A B, so 
by C F- B--+A and (K - l ) ,  B--~A E K "-A A B, so by B E K-  A A B and 
(K-" 1) again, A E K ' -A  A B, contradicting our hypothesis. 
(GEE4): Let K r L. Since K is a theory, A A J_ ~ K. So K ' -AA  • = K, 
by (K-3).  But then clearly I < A, i.e., A E K-A  A • and Z ~ K -A  A 1, 
if and only if A E K. 
(GEE41): Let A E K and B ~ K. We have to show that A E K ' -A  A B 
and B ~ K'--A A B. But this is immediate from (K - l )  and (K-" 3). 
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Now let - over K in addition satisfy (K-4).  
(GEE5): Let ~/A. We want to show that A < T. By (Def<), this means 
that T E K -  (A A T) and A ~ K ' -  (A A T). The former follows from (K -  1). 
The latter means, by (K-6),  that A ~ K'-A,  which follows from ~/A and 
(K=4). 
Now let - over K satisfy (K=7). 
(GEE5~): Let A < T and B ;~ Y,i.e., T E K-A  A T, A ~ K -A  A T, 
and T ~ K ' -B  A T or B E K-B  A T. Since by (K'- I)  T E K-A  A T 
and T E K' -B  AT,  this means that A ~ K-A  and B E K-B ,  by 
(K-" 6). We want to show that A < B, i.e., that B E K-A  A B and A 
K -A  A B. Since B E K, by (K-" 2), we have, using (K-5),  (B--~A)--+B E
K'-(B-+A), so B E K-(B--+A), by (K - l ) .  Using (K-7) ,  we get B E 
K-  B N K - (B -~A)  C_ K - (B  A (B--~A)) = K -  A A B, by (K-6).  Now 
suppose for reductio that also A E K -  A A B. By B E K -  A A B and (K -  8c), 
we have K-A  A B C K -A ,  so A E K-A ,  contradicting our hypothesis. 
(iii) Let < satisfy (GEE1) - (GEE3 +) and let - = C(<) and <* = E(C(<)). 
Then we have 
A <*B 
iff 
iff either 
or  
iff either 
or  
B E K -A  A B and A ~ K ' -A  A B (by (Def<)) 
B E K ' -AABandA ~ I ( -AAB,  andAAB ~ f fo r  
AAB~T 
B E [ ( ' -AABandA ~ K-AABandAAB E Kand 
AAB<T 
BE/~2andA~K,  andAAB~KorAAB~T 
B E K andAA B < (AAB)  V B and(A ~ K or AA  B 
(AAB)  VA)andAAB E IgandAAB <T(by(Def - ) )  
iff either A ~ K and B E K 
or AABEKandAAB<B 
Lemma 4(ii)) 
iff either A ~ K and B E K 
or AAB EKandA<B 
iff B CKand(A~KorA<B)  
(K is a theory) 
(K is a theory, (GEE?), 
((GE2+) and (GE3+)) 
(K is a theory). 
It follows readily that <* and < agree within K, and that <* and < are 
identical, if < satisfies in addition (GEE4) and (GEE4/). 
(iv) Let - satisfy (K - l )  - (K-3) ,  (K -5)  and (K-6),  and let < = E( - )  
and - *  = C(E(-)) .  Then we have 
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B E K -*A  
iff either 
or 
iff either 
or  
B E K,  andA ~_ KorA  ~ T 
B E KandA < AVB andA E K andA < T (by(Def-)) 
B E K, andA ~ KorT  ~ K-AATorA  E K -AAT 
A,B E KandT E K-AATandA ~_ K-AAT and 
AVB E K - (AA (A V B)) andA ~ K - (AA (AV B)) 
(by (Def<)) 
iff either B E K,  and A ~ K or A E K -A  
or A,B E K and A ~ K -  A and A V B E K -  A (by (K : I )  
and (K-6)) 
iff either B E K and K -A  = K (by (K=I ) -  (K-3) and (K-5)) 
or BEKandAEKandAr  
(by (K-5) and (K- l ) )  
iff either B E K -  A and f f  - A = K 
or B E K:A  and K -A  ~ K (by (K - l ) -  (K-3) and (K-5)) 
iff B E K-A .  
Proof of Therem 3 Let R be a binary relation over L. Clearly, if R is 
extensible to a GEE-relation <, then it must satisfy (EC). For suppose there 
is a finite set {(A1, B1), . . . ,  (A,~, Bn)} C_ R c_ < such that B1 A. . .  A Bn k 
AI A ... A An. Then Lemma 4(iv) and (GEE2~) give us AI A ... A An < 
A1 A. . .  A A,~, contradicting Lemma 4(ii). 
For the converse direction, suppose that R satisfies (EC). Now define two 
operators Up and Down on binary relations P over L as follows: 
Up(P)  = { (A, B) : there are pairs (A, C1), . . . ,  (A, C,~) E P such that 
C1,...,Cm k B} 
Down(P)  = {{A, B) : there is apair (C, B) E P suchthat A k B---~C} 
Then define R0 = R, R2i+l  = Up(R2i), R2i+2 = Down(R2i+l ), and 
<= URn. 
iEu.., 
Now clearly, R C_ <, since R/ C_ Ri+l for every i. Moreover, < satisfies 
(GEEr and (GEE;), by construction and the finitary character of (GEE$). 
Finally, for (GEE1), suppose for reductio that T < T. Then (T, T) E R4 for 
some i. This Ri then violates (EC). But as R satisfies (EC), this contradicts 
the fact that both Up and Down preserve (EC), as we are now going to show. 
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First, suppose that a relation P satisfies (EC), but Up(P) does not. The 
latter means that there is a finite set {(A1,B1),...,(A,~,Bn)} C_ Up(P) 
such that B1 A. . .  A Bn ~- A1 A. . .  A A,~. By the definition of Up(P), then, 
there are finite sets/-/1,..., Hn such that Hi k- Bi and (Ai, C) ~ P for every 
C E Hi. But since A H1 A. . .  A A/-In }- A1 A. . .  A An, we have a violation 
of (EC) in P, contradicting the assumption that P satisfies (EC). 
Second, suppose that a relation P satisfies (EC), but Down(P) does 
not. The latter means that there is a finite set {(A1, B1) , . . . ,  (An, Bn)} C 
Down(P) such that B1 A ... A Bn }-- A1 A ... A An. By the definition of 
Down(P), then, there are sentences C1,. . . ,  C,~ such that Ai F- Bi---+Ci and 
(Ci, Bi) E Pforevery i. Burthen BIA.. .ABn k- (B1---+C1)A...A(Brz---+Cn), 
and hence B1 A. . .  A Bn ~- C1 A. . .  A C,~, contradicting the assumption that 
P satisfies (EC). 
This completes the proof of the theorem. (Note incidentally that < as 
constructed above is the smallest GEE-relation extending R.) 
Proof of Lemma 6 Clearly, a pair (A, B) is inconsistent with a GEE- 
relation < if B < B---+A. For every GEE-relation with B < B-+A and A < 
B would have B A A < ((B---+A) A B), by Lemma 4(iv), so B A A < B A A, 
by (GEE21"), contradicting Lemma 4(ii). 
Now suppose for the converse that (A, B) is inconsistent with <. Since < 
is a GEE-relation, it satisfies (EC). Since < U (A, B) is inconsistent, however, 
it does not satisfy (EC). Hence there are D1, . . . ,  D~, E l , . . . ,  ET~ such that 
Di < Ei for every i and E1 A . . .  A En A B ~- D1 A ... A D,~ A A. Now 
application of Lemma 4(iv) gives us D1 A. . .  A D,~ < E 1 A . . .  A E n. Hence, 
by (GEE;), ((El A . . .  A En)-+(D1 A ... A D,~)) < E1 A ... A En. But on 
the one hand, B }- (El A ... A En)---~(D1 A ... A D, 0. So by (GEE2+), 
B < E 1 A . . .  A E~n. And on the other hand, E 1 /~ . . .  A E n ~- B--+A. So by 
(GEE21"), B < B--~A, as desired. 
Proof of Lemma 7 We decided to set aside (SEFA) and (SEE5). By 
Lemma 5, then, it suffices to show that < is extensible to a GEE-relation 
which satisfies virtual connectivity, (SEE1). 
Let < be a GEE-relation. < satisfies (EC). Since L is supposed to be count- 
able, we can fix an enumeration (A1, B1, C1 ), (A2, B2, C2), (A3, B3, C3) . . . .  
of all triples in L. We make true all instances of virtual connectivity by work- 
ing through this list in the following manner. If Ai y~ Bi, we step to the next 
triple. If Ai < Bi, on the other hand, we check whether one of Ai < Ci and 
Ci < Bi holds. If so, we again step to the next triple. If not, we add one of 
the pairs (Ai, Ci) and (Ci, Bi) to <, and we do this in such a way that (EC) 
is preserved. We shall presently show that this is possible. Let the new pair 
be (Ai, Ci); the other case is similar. Then we extend < tO (Ai, Ci) to a new 
GEE-relation, which is possible, by Theorem 3. We repeat hat process for 
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every i C co. Then we define <+ as the union of all these GEE-relations. Since 
<+ is the union of a non-empty chain of GEE-relations, it is itself a GEE- 
relation. And it satisfies (SEE1) by construction. So <+ is a SEE-relation 
extending <, i.e., < C <+, as desired. 
We are left to show that it is possible consistently toextend aGEE-relation 
< such that A < B by either (A, C) or (C, B). Suppose it is not. Then, by 
Lemma 6, we have C < C--+A and B < B---~C. But also A < B. Putting 
these three pieces together with the help of Lemma 4(iv), we get C A B A A < 
(C--,A) A (B---~C) A B. By (GEE2?), we finally get C A B A A < C A B A A, 
contradicting Lemma 4(ii). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 4 Clearly, every GEE-relation < is a subset of the 
meet of all SEE-relations extending it. To show that it is no proper subset, 
suppose that A ~ /3. We have to show that there is a SEE-relation <+ 
extending < such that A ~+ B. To see that this is true, we first add, under 
preservation of (EC), (B, B---,A) to <. We shall presently prove that this is 
possible. Then we extend this set to a SEE-relation <+, which is possible 
according to Lemma 8. But by Lemma 6, no GEE-relation, and a forfiori 
no SEE-relation, containing (B, B---~A) can contain (A, B). Thus we have 
found a SEE-relation <+ extending < such that A ~+ B, as desired. 
We are left to show that it is possible consistently toextend aGEE-relation 
< such that A ~ B by the pair (B, B---~A). Suppose it is not. Then, by Lemma 
6, we have B--~A < (B---~A)--~B. This gives us, by (GEE21), B--+A < B. 
Hence by (GEE2+), A < B, contradicting our hypothesis. This completes the 
proof. 
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